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Introduction
Innovation is commonly acknowledged 
to be a principal element in economic 
growth and competitiveness (Capello 
and Nijkamp, 2009; Harris, 2011). 
Entrepreneurship is also a key source 
of such growth (Audretsch et al. 2006). 
There is a growing school of thought 
that the networks facilitating flows of 
knowledge within and across regions 
are an important underpinning factor 
(Huggins and Izushi, 2007). Furthermore, 
regions are increasingly considered to be 
important foci of economic development 
and organisation in a globalised economy 
(Malecki, 2007; Fritsch and Mueller, 
2004). The ability of regions to gain from 
the positive effects of entrepreneurship 
is likely to depend on their capability to 
turn knowledge into regional innovation 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008). The 
innovation systems literature, especially 
the regional variety, highlights the flow 
of knowledge across organisations as 
a crucial factor for effective innovation 
(Cooke et al. 2011).
This article focuses on those three 
contemporary determinants of 
development at the regional level: 
entrepreneurship; innovation and 
networks. Drawing on examples from 
Silicon Valley; Taiwan and Finland, 
it is argued that an open networked 
environment, built upon global knowledge 
search, is central to successful innovation 
and entrepreneurship, and subsequently 
regional competitiveness. In particular, 
it contrasts the open model of economic 
development adopted by Taiwan, 
especially the activities of its diaspora, 
and the more closed model associated 
formerly with Finland. Also, it shows 
how the enduring success of Silicon 
Valley has occurred through processes of 
networked connectivity and recombinant 
innovation.
Entrepreneurship and a Network-
Based View of Innovation
Entrepreneurship is increasingly 
recognised as a crucial element in 
fostering economic growth (Carree 
and Thurik, 2006). The capability of 
entrepreneurs to influence economic 
development is related to their capacity 
to access and exploit knowledge and 
generate innovation. Romer (2007, p. 
128) states that ‘economic growth occurs 
whenever people take resources and 
rearrange them in ways that are valuable 
… [It] springs from better recipes, not 
just more cooking’.
Within the growth process, knowledge 
spills over from one organisation to 
others. Knowledge generation therefore 
has external benefits not entirely 
appropriated by one firm, resulting in 
the generation of increasing returns 
(Capello and Nijkamp, 2009). Such 
knowledge, however, is not a purely 
public good, but one that can be 
partially appropriated, such as through 
the use of intellectual property rights, 
hence organisations have incentives 
for investing in its creation. Theoretical 
models seeking to explain innovation 
outputs, such as patents, are based on a 
knowledge production function in which 
organisations (i.e. firms) intentionally 
pursue new economic knowledge as 
a means of generating innovation 
(Audretsch, 2000). This can lead to 
subsequent rounds of appropriation 
and exploitation of knowledge spilling 
over from organisations which have 
made investments. Despite these 
theoretical developments, endogenous 
growth theorists throw little light on 
the mechanisms by which knowledge 
is transmitted across firms and 
organisations (Storper and Venables, 
2004), suggesting the need for a better 
understanding of the role of investments 
in generating spillover conduits 
(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
Emerging theories of the firm such 
as the knowledge-based view (Grant, 
1996) and extensions of the resource-
based view (Lavie, 2006) recognise that 
the need to access knowledge is a key 
reason why firms build or enter networks 
with other organisations. These networks 
may arise through the need to access 
new technology, skills or expertise in 
order to keep pace with competitors 
(Ahuja, 2000).
Networks in this context consist of the 
interactions and production relationships 
organisations (principally firms) utilise to 
access knowledge. In other words, these 
networks consist of the means by which 
knowledge flows across organisations 
beyond the direct purchasing of 
it. Networks of this kind generally 
come into being because markets for 
knowledge are rare. Owing to inherent 
asymmetry in the existing information 
base of buyers and sellers (Arrow, 1971; 
Malecki, 2010) markets in knowledge 
are difficult to sustain. In the case of 
knowledge protected by property rights, 
such as patents and copyrights, market 
transactions are possible but in the 
case of implicit knowledge or know-how 
they are almost impossible. Networks, 
therefore, are increasingly found to act 
as a conduit facilitating the flow of skills 
and expertise in technology, R&D and 
the like (Weterings and Ponds, 2009). 
Increasingly, this process is a systematic 
undertaking, i.e. organisations no longer 
innovate in isolation but through a 
complex set of interactions with other 
organisations (Chesbrough, 2003). It is 
through the networks underpinning these 
systemic processes that organisations 
access knowledge that they cannot, 
or do not wish to, generate internally 
(Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm, 2011).
Recombinant Innovation and Silicon 
Valley
As the information revolution has 
greatly multiplied the types of potential 
solutions to any technical problem, the 
chances that the best answer is reached 
by further development of the current 
technique decrease. In developing 
new products, firms, therefore, rely 
less on internal units for whom pursuit 
of particular development paths may 
become an inviolable routine, and search 
out external partners and scan for novel 
solutions. That, with many other factors, 
contributes to the disintegration of 
the vertically integrated firm, and the 
concomitant growth of global supply 
chains in which suppliers all along the 
chain are expected to co-design, and 
continuously improve the performance 
of the products they provide their 
customers (Sturgeon, 2002; Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2004).
With global competition and information 
technology creating a proliferation of 
new potential solutions and pathways, 
innovation has become unpredictable and 
recombinant, with multiple competing 
solutions with different strengths in 
different contexts. Hence, the progress 
of technology becomes increasingly 
unpredictable insofar as there can be no 
expectation that one good solution will 
lead by a natural progression to another. 
Counter-intuitively, the more knowledge 
about the world as a whole accumulates, 
the less confident we can be about the 
kind of knowledge that will prove useful 
in any particular enterprise. By the same 
token, the more development depends 
on applying knowledge from domains 
traditionally unrelated to an industry’s 
core activities, the less meaningful is 
the idea of a technological frontier – it 
is everywhere and nowhere – and the 
less confident we can be that leadership 
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Innovative Recombination in Silicon Valley
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today assures leadership tomorrow. In 
these circumstances it may well be more 
important to be able to search effectively 
across domains than to dominate the 
generation of ideas and technologies 
within any one of them (Saxenian and 
Sabel, 2008).
Silicon Valley has grown through 
increasing specialisation and repeated 
waves of recombination of skills. As 
shown by Figure 1, productivity and 
value added continue to rise with 
each successive wave of technology. 
Through processes of fragmentation and 
reintegration there has been a repeated 
blurring of industrial boundaries from, for 
example, PC to internet to mobile web to 
the latest generation of web applications 
– web browsers, search engines, social 
networking – all combining similar 
components including programming 
languages, protocols, standards, 
software libraries, productivity tools, etc. 
While we often think of Silicon Valley as 
being made up of corporate giants – HP, 
Intel, Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter - 
there is a remarkable amount of churn in 
the industrial system, with the majority 
of the region’s largest 20 corporations in 
1980s and 1990s no longer on that list. 
Indeed, small firms collectively represent 
a major force in Silicon Valley’s dynamics, 
and they have made, and will continue to 
remake, the regional economy (Huggins, 
2008).
Fundamentally, Silicon Valley’s success 
stems from a regional ecosystem rich 
in high quality institutions that promote 
entrepreneurial experimentation, open 
labour markets, firm specialisation, 
venture capital networks, collective 
learning and regional adaptation.
Within Silicon Valley, firms of all sizes 
interact in the ecosystem, in which 
superior technology trumps business 
size, with innovation occurring in a 
highly decentralized environment, 
with the benefits of proximity - dense 
social and professional networks, 
informal information exchange, cross-
firm collaboration, and serendipity - 
outweighing the high and rising costs 
of being in the area (Saxenian, 1994). 
Innovation, therefore, no longer occurs 
in isolated laboratories, but rather 
through collaborative co-development 
networks between increasingly specialist 
producers. Innovation at all stages of the 
production process is a highly iterative 
process. Learning happens through 
continuing interactions facilitated 
by social networks and open labour 
markets, which allow know-how and 
information to circulate freely. It is 
possible to contribute to the formation 
of such an ecosystem, but it cannot be 
planned from the top down, and once 
it gets started, the strength of such a 
system is that it fosters unanticipated re-
combinations of skill and technology, and 
multiple, often parallel, experiments with 
technology, organisation, markets, and 
so forth. Learning happens through trial 
and error – and often through failure. 
Failure is common, not a stigma, and is 
a highly social process in which people 
learn through their own and others’ 
mistakes and in which the trust that 
grows from face-to-face interaction, and 
the serendipity that grows out of the free 
circulation of ideas and talent, create 
positive feedback loops.
Open Innovation Networks and 
Diasporas
The open network paradigm means that 
innovation can come from anywhere, and 
that once “peripheral” and uncompetitive 
regions can link into global supply 
chains. Research has shown a powerful 
role played by the diasporas of particular 
nations and regions, which have 
been styled the New Argonauts after 
the heroes of Greek mythology, who 
travelled afar and endured great dangers 
in search of the golden fleece (Saxenian, 
2006). In the case of Silicon Valley, 
foreign born, US educated engineers 
who have learned the Valley model, 
have had great successes and then 
collaborated with their home-country 
counterparts to develop the context 
for entrepreneurial development. They 
are ideally positioned (as both insiders 
and outsiders at home and abroad) to 
search beyond prevailing routines to 
identify opportunities for complementary 
“peripheral” participation in the global 
economy and to work with public officials 
on the corresponding adaptation and 
redesign of relevant institutions and 
firms in their native countries. They are, 
in other words, exemplary protagonists 
of the process of self-discovery and open 
industrial policy; although surely there 
are different institutional arrangements 
in other contexts that are as effective as 
well, (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2002).
Diasporas are not new, nor is the interest 
of policymakers and scholars in their 
developmental potential (Saxenian, 
2006). What is new, or relatively so, 
is the focus on the highly educated 
migrants who have long been viewed 
as a serious loss to poor economies 
(the brain drain). Low transportation 
and communications costs now allow 
those who go abroad for further training 
or in search of work to interact and 
collaborate with their home-country 
counterparts far more extensively than 
was feasible in earlier eras of emigration. 
A small but growing number of migrants 
have even become fully “transnational”, 
with dual citizenship and residences 
in both their home and their adopted 
countries. Early research on diaspora 
contributions investigated remittances 
or direct investments, which can provide 
a stable source of finance and alleviate 
poverty, but typically have a limited long-
term impact. The recent literature, by 
contrast, suggests that skilled migrants 
can alter the developmental trajectory of 
a poor country through the diffusion of 
knowledge and/or technology transfers, 
in a shift from a brain drain of talent 
away from the home country to “brain 
circulation” between the home country 
and the core economies (Saxenian, 
Motoyama and Quan 2002, Saxenian, 
2006). Much of the newer literature 
(and the public policies which it has 
stimulated) treats the diaspora as an 
asset, valuable insofar as it adds to 
the home country’s stock of capital not 
through remittances, but in intellectual 
property or reputational capital or related 
forms of wealth.
Furthermore, the spatial differentiation 
of economic activity that is typically 
linked to industrial specialisation means 
that a focus on national indicators 
and institutions can obscure critical 
transformations that occur at the sub-
national level. The state, in developing 
as well as in developed countries, is 
not a unified whole, but rather consists 
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of multiple, differently organised, units 
with various political and economic 
resources, jurisdictions, and interests. 
It is precisely this heterogeneity that 
permits innovation and growth within 
a generally unpromising context 
(Kuznetsov and Sabel 2007). The new 
Argonauts bring to their home countries 
expertise in specific industries that are 
located in a small number of urban areas 
or regions, and they collaborate only with 
a subset of domestic entrepreneurs and 
policymakers (Saxenian, 2006). Thus, 
economic and institutional change begins 
in certain locations and/or domains and 
advances through partial and incremental 
(micro-level) reforms that aggregate into 
larger-scale transformations with time. 
A particular example of this is the role 
of the Taiwanese diaspora in helping 
establish Taiwan as an open networked 
and successful economy.
Comparing ‘Open’ Taiwan with 
‘Closed’ Finland
At the end of the 19th century both 
Taiwan and Finland were in fact or in 
law colonies, and suffered the forms of 
economic marginality typically associated 
with that status. Finland, having passed 
from Swedish to Russian sovereignty in 
1809, only became independent from 
Russia in 1917. Taiwan, having been 
occupied by Japan on and off since 1592 
became a territory of that country in 
1895, and came under the control of 
the Kuomintang (KMT), in flight from 
China, but was formally released from all 
Japanese claims in 1952. Economically, 
there are a number of commonalities in 
their evolution, and as recently as the 
1960s both were small, economically 
marginal economies. Both were relatively 
late to industrialisation, and in the 
1970s-80s strong developmental states 
led to resource mobilisation in technology 
sectors, with heavy investments in R&D 
and universities, and a goal to catch up 
to the ‘global technological frontier’. 
By 1980 Finland was the economically 
stronger with a GDP per capita of 
US$8,609m compared with US$3,571 in 
Taiwan.
In the 1990s, both emerged as global 
ICT leaders with Finland creating and 
leading the mobile phone industry, and 
Taiwan dominating integrated circuit 
(IC) design and manufacturing, and 
electronic systems production. By 
2000, in Finland, Nokia was pioneering 
technical and design innovation, with 
dizzying growth (40% world market 
for mobile phones), supported by a 
“national” system of innovation, and 
expanded production to India, Hungary, 
and China. Taiwan pioneered the IC 
foundry business, with state investment 
in IC and electronics research, and the 
expansion of production to the greater 
Shanghai region.
By 2000, both Finland and Taiwan could 
be viewed as parallel global models of 
ICT success, but underlying processes 
differed dramatically, which only became 
apparent in mid-late 2000s. In Finland, 
a crisis in leading industries, including 
ICT led to a deepening recession, and 
whilst Taiwan also suffered an economic 
downturn there was continued export 
growth. As result by 2010, Taiwan had 
surpassed Japan, Korea, UK, France 
and Israel in GDP per capita, which 
stood at US$ 49,970, compared with 
US$ 34,454 in Finland. In the case of 
Finland, its problems can be viewed as 
stemming from the closed innovation 
model associated with Nokia and the 
nation’s innovation system, with there 
being no vigorous mechanism for 
the exploration of new markets, and 
investment in the ‘national system of 
innovation’ emphasised refinements of 
existing technologies and more extensive 
exploitation of existing markets.
National systems of innovation, Finland’s 
included, were often designed with 
the idea of closing the gap between a 
country’s capabilities in particular areas 
and the respective world technological 
frontier (Saxenian and Sabel, 2008). 
Such systems, however, become less 
useful as the “boundary” begins to 
wander. In the worst case, the national 
system of innovation can actually impede 
progress by focusing attention, and 
fixing resources, on the problems that 
would have been central to an industry 
if unanticipated connections to other 
bodies of knowledge had not rendered 
them irrelevant. The risk of a monolithic 
strategy is self-blocking entrenchment, 
and in the case of Finland, that left Nokia 
– as by far the most dominant economic 
actor - unprepared for boundary-blurring 
innovations introduced by Apple, Google, 
and others.
As a result of such entrenchment, 
organisational trajectories become very 
difficult to change as engineering teams 
and product groups are locked in to 
existing cognitive and organizational 
routines. Nokia went from boom to 
almost-bust. After being an early 
innovator and mobile design pioneer, it 
continued to hone its mastery of complex 
supply chains and antennae technology. 
Yet, it has struggled to adjust to the idea 
– unlike Apple or Google – of the cell 
phone as mobile portal to the internet. At 
the same time, its success in emerging 
markets depended on relentless attention 
to lowering the costs of high-volume 
products, and so increased the pressures 
for and rewards to cost-reducing 
efficiencies, making the re-direction of 
the organization that much harder.
In contrast to Finland, Taiwan has 
economically forged ahead on the 
global stage. The diaspora has closely 
collaborated with the government 
to design institutions to support 
entrepreneurship and innovative search, 
and in stark contrast to Finland, venture 
capital has become a powerful search 
network to identify and (re) combine 
parts of firms — financial, technical or 
marketing expertise, managerial talent, 
IP — to form ventures that in turn 
become new nodes in networks for co-
designing and building new products. 
By supporting a diverse portfolio of 
ventures and combining hands-on 
monitoring and mentoring with market 
selection, investors in Taiwan are thus 
institutionalizing a process of continuous 
economic restructuring, and learning 
about how to improve restructuring itself, 
which transforms the domestic economy 
by linking it to the most demanding and 
capable actors in global markets.
Entrepreneurship, vertical decomposition 
and the clustering of IC and electronic 
system production has facilitated 
deepening specialisation and the co-
design of components, subsystems, and 
periodic re-integration. The diaspora is 
instrumental in collaborative exploration 
and innovative recombination, and 
establishing cross-regional collaboration, 
mutual upgrading and cross-cluster 
linkages between Taiwan and Silicon 
Valley. Firms in Taiwan shifting from 
vertical integration to collaborative 
exploration of new markets with outsiders 
have had to invent, and continue to adjust 
to changing circumstance, new forms of 
contracting, joint venturing and strategic 
alliance; a myriad of organisational forms 
between hierarchy and market that, taken 
together, are changing the boundaries 
of the firm and perhaps its very nature. 
In particular, novel institutions in the 
form of search networks are connecting 
actors, domestic and foreign, engaged in 
potentially complementary searches.
Whilst Taiwan sought to imitate Silicon 
Valley in 1980s, and acted as a provider 
of low cost labour and components, the 
strong connections that subsequently 
formed have led to a relationship based 
on parity of esteem. The co-creation 
of a venture capital industry facilitated 
return entrepreneurship, cross-regional 
collaboration and innovation, and a 
reciprocal upgrading along the value 
chain.
Policy Lessons
In his classic 1955 article, Francois 
Perroux (1955) argued that in the 
end “scale” and “innovation” are the 
predictors of success, whereas Albert 
Hirschman (1958) recognized the role 
of interdependence and linkages across 
related sectors in achieving economic 
growth. The process of consolidating and 
connecting knowledge clusters shows that 
these principles remain key to change in 
today’s global economy. In particular, 
some of the world’s most prominent 
regional clusters are open operating 
networks seeking new knowledge as 
the means to more efficiently exploit 
their existing knowledge base. In Silicon 
Valley, it is clear that cluster actors 
utilize the benefits of proximity to build 
and manage global-scale production 
networks (Sturgeon, 2002). The key 
aspect of these developments is that 
the knowledge base of the world’s most 
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advanced regional economies is no longer 
exclusively local, but positioned within 
global knowledge networks, connecting 
clusters and their actors.
Furthermore, national innovation systems 
are becoming more “leaky” over time, 
whereby “the role of tacit knowledge and 
the spatial limits on knowledge spillovers 
have caused firms to locate R&D facilities 
where new knowledge is being created” 
(Carlsson, 2006, p. 65). As a result, 
regional policy making is seeking to 
shift toward fostering more open and 
connected systems, with clusters able 
to renew themselves and evolve through 
innovation. Clusters must themselves 
be subject to innovation and change in 
much the same way that products have 
to change if they are to diminish the risk 
of having a short shelf life.
Although it is undoubtedly impossible to 
replicate or clone regions such as Silicon 
Valley, or any other knowledge cluster for 
that matter, there are many lessons that 
can be learned about how to improve 
the competitiveness of regions and in 
particular the role networks have played 
in making regions with strong clusters 
centres of global growth. At the same 
time, it is important to recognise that the 
challenges involved in the creation and 
sustaining of such clusters are contingent 
on prevailing local and global factors. 
For instance, the past failure of many 
science parks as a policy response for 
generating high-technology activity can 
be related to the fact that, although they 
facilitated the co-location of companies, 
such policies ignored the processes 
through which this co-location could be 
developed into meaningful interaction 
and collaboration, particularly between 
industry and academia.
It has long been argued that most 
science park developments are no more 
than high-tech fantasies, contributing 
little to increased links between industry 
and the academic world (Massey, 
Quintas and Wield, 1992). An important 
lesson for most regions, especially the 
less competitive, is that the ‘Silicon 
Valley recipe’ of merely investing in 
ingredients such as technology parks, 
university research, engineers, venture 
capital, and incubators alone is unlikely 
to prove successful. Rather than 
seeking to replicate the components 
and ingredients of successful regions, 
a more fruitful approach is to connect 
with them through both firm-level and 
regional collaborations. In particular, 
there is need to nurture global and local 
open search networks, and to define 
and invest in distinct capacities through 
processes of experimentation. Diasporas 
potentially play an important role as 
global search networkers, connecting to 
the ‘global leading edge’ and scanning 
for new markets, partners and solutions. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
diasporas can support policymakers in 
defining strategy, transferring global 
“best practice”, linking to customers and 
partners, brokering technology and its 
institutional adoption, and overcoming 
political opposition to reform.
Note
1. This paper was inspired by the address that AnnaLee Saxenian of the University of California, Berkeley, gave to the International 
Symposium, and is written with her agreement. I am grateful to her for kindly providing access to some of the case-study data and 
other information used in this paper.
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